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Droit De Suite: Only Congress Can Grant Royalty
Protection for Artists
Congress has enacted the 1976 Copyright Act which does not grant resale
royalties to fine artists. It does, however, add a strong preemption provi-
sion that was not a part of the 1909 Act. This provision emphatically
preempts any state law granting a right equivalent to a right granted by
the federal statute to any work which is the subject matter of copyright. In
its desire to increase protection for fine artists, the State of California has
enacted the first droit de suite legislation in the United States, patterned
after European copyright law, which extends resale royalties to fine
artists.
This comment demonstrates that despite the fact that the 1976 Act does
not mention a resale royalty for fine artists the California Resale Royalties
Act is preempted byfederal law since droit de suite covers subject matter
which is copyrightable and is equivalent to a right granted by the 1976 Act.
The author believes that workable droit de suite legislation must be en-
acted and enforced on the federal level in order to allow fine artists to ben-
efit as their work increases in value.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Copyright Act of 1976
In 1976 the United States Congress enacted the Copyright Act
of 1976,1 the first major revision of federal copyright law since
1909.2 This legislation implemented many changes in the copy-
right law. The 1976 Act provides increased protection to artists
beyond that given by the 1909 Act.3 Among the major differences
* A version of this article has won the Nathan Burkan Memorial Competi-
tion at Pepperdine University School of Law and has been entered in the 1981 na-
tional competition sponsored by ASCAP.
1. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1976 Act]. The effective date of
the 1976 Act was January 1, 1978, except for §§ 118, 304(b), and ch. 8, which became
effective on October 19, 1976.
2. Copyright Act, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (repealed January 1, 1976; cur-
rent version at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976)) [hereinafter cited as 1909 Act]. Prior to the
enactment of the 1976 Act, the 1909 Act defined the scope of copyright protection
accorded authors, artists, and inventors. See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, which
provides: "The Congress shall have Power... [t]o promote the Progress of Sci-
ence and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
3. "What the statute confers on authors that some of them could not have ob-
tained before is access to the federal courts and to their heavy battery of statutory
remedies, such as nationally enforceable injunctions, minimum damages, and dis-
cretionary attorney's fees." Brown, Unification: A Cheerful Requiem for Common
is the 1976 Act provision which extends the term of copyright pro-
tection to the artists for life plus fifty years,4 as contrasted with
the 1909 Act coverage of fifty-six years.5 Another important revi-
sion in the new law is the express reversal of the presumption
that by selling a tangible work without placing any conditions or
restrictions upon the sale, the artist also assigns the copyright to
the buyer.6
The purpose of extending copyright protection to artists is to
encourage the production of creative expression. 7 This is accom-
plished by the inducement of giving the artist a property right in
the fixed form of his expression.8 The property right given is es-
Law Copyright, 24 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 1070, 1089 (1977). See also 1976 Act, supra note
1, at §§ 502, 504(c) and 505.
4. 1976 Act, supra note 1, at § 302(a).
5. Upon registration under the 1909 Act an automatic term of coverage of 28
years was granted. In addition, upon the expiration of this term, coverage could
be renewed for 28 years by an affirmative act. 1909 Act, supra note 2, at § 24.
6. That presumption had been firmly established in Pushman v. New York
Graphic Soc'y, 287 N.Y. 302, 39 N.E.2d 249 (1942). In Pushman the artist never ex-
pressly agreed to sell his common-law copyright and reproduction rights along
with his painting, nor did he forbid it. Id. at 305, 39 N.E.2d at 250. Common-law
copyright attached to a work upon its creation. 1909 Act, supra note 2, at § 2. Stat-
utory protection was not afforded until a work was actually published. Id. at § 10.
A work of art is "published" when a copy is distributed to the public "by sale or
other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending." 1976 Act, supra note 1,
at § 101. The Court of Appeals of New York held that "an artist must, if he wishes
to retain or protect the reproduction right, make some reservation of that right
when he sells the painting." 287 N.Y. at 308, 39 N.E.2d at 251. The 1976 Act re-
versed this presumption by conferring federal statutory copyright protection upon
a work of art from its fixation in a tangible form. 1976 Act, supra note 1, at § 102.
"On and after January 1, 1978 . . . no person is entitled to any such right- or
equivalent right in any such work under the common law or statutes of any State."
Id. at § 301(a). The 1976 Act thereby emphatically did away with common-law
copyright.
7. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954), in which
the Court stated: "The economic philosophy behind the [constitutional] clause
empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that en-
couragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance pub-
lic welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and useful
Arts."' Id. at 219. See also Boz Scaggs Music v. KND Corp., 491 F. Supp. 908, 912
(D. Conn. 1980). WKND broadcast copyrighted musical compositions without pay-
ing royalty fees. The court held the station liable for copyright infringement. Be-
cause infringement so powerfully violates the Congressional policy that artists be
given economic incentive, the plaintiffs were granted the full range of remedies,
including statutory damages, injunctive relief, and reasonable attorney's fees.
8. Section 106 of the 1976 Act provides in pertinent part that, subject to cer-
tain limitations enumerated in §§ 107 through 118,
the owner of copyright under this .title has the exclusive rights to do and
to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
lending; ...
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sentially a monopoly.9 However, because it is only the expression
and not the underlying idea that is being protected,o "Congress
and the courts have been careful to limit the copyright monop-
oly."'" Among these limitations is section 301 of the 1976 Actl2
which expressly preempts any state law purporting to give a right
equivalent to a right granted by federal statute 3 concerning any
work covered by the Copyright Act.14
(5) in the case of ... pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works ... to dis-
play the copyrighted work publicly.
1976 Act, supra note 1, at § 106.
9. Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1980). "A
grant of copyright in a published work secures for its author a limited monopoly
over the expression it contains." Id. at 974. See also, Goldstein, Preempted State
Doctrines, Involuntary Transfers and Compulsory Licenses: Testing the Limits of
Copyright, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1107 (1977).
10. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930). The idea-ex-
pression dichotomy that Judge Learned Hand spoke of, id. at 121, was codified in
the 1976 Act at sections 102 and 103. Section 102 describes the subject matter as
follows:
(a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in origi-
nal works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now
known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced,
or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device. Works of authorship include the following categories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and
(7) sound recordings.
(b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of author-
ship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is de-
scribed, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.
1976 Act, supra note 1, at § 102.
Section 103 adds compilations and derivative works to the subject matter of copy-
right.
In formulating the 1976 Act, Congress expressly recognized that the idea-expres-
sion dichotomy must be preserved:
Copyright does not preclude others from using the ideas or information
revealed by the author's work...
Section 102(b) in no way enlarges or contracts the scope of copyright
protection under present law. Its purpose is to restate, in the context of
the new single Federal system of copyright, that the basic dichotomy be-
tween expression and idea remains unchanged.
H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 56, 57 (1976).
11. Goldstein, supra note 9, at 1107.
12. 1976 Act, supra note 1, at § 301. See notes 32 and 34 infra.
13. Id. at § 106. See note 8 supra.
14. Id. at § 102. See note 10 supra.
B. The California Resale Royalties Act
In 1976 the California legislature also sought to expand upon
the rights of artists by passing the California Resale Royalties
Act,15 a form of droit de suite. Literally translated as a follow-up
15. CAL. CIv. CODE § 986 (West Supp. 1981) [hereinafter cited as section 986].
Section 986 provides:
(a) When ever a work of fine art is sold and the seller resides in Califor-
nia or the sale takes place in California, the seller or his agent shall pay to
the artist of such work of fine art or to such artist's agent 5 percent of the
amount of such sale....
(1) When a work of art is sold at an auction or by a gallery, dealer, bro-
ker, museum, or other person acting as the agent for the seller the agent
shall withhold 5 percent of the amount of the sale, locate the artist and
pay the artist.
(2) If the seller or agent is unable to locate and pay the artist within 90
days, an amount equal to 5 percent of the amount of the sale shall be
transferred to the Arts Council.
(3) If a seller or his agent fails to pay an artist the amount equal to 5
percent of the sale of a work of fine art by the artist or fails to transfer
such amount to the Arts Council, the artist may bring an action for dam-
ages within three years after the date of sale or one year after the discov-
ery of the sale, whichever is longer.
(4) Moneys received by the council pursuant to this section shall be
deposited in an account in the Special Deposit Fund in the State
Treasury.
(5) The Arts Council shall attempt to locate any artist for whom
money is received pursuant to this section. If the council is unable to lo-
cate the artist and the artist does not file a written claim for the money
received by the council within seven years of the date of sale of the work
of fine art, the right of the artist terminates and such money shall be
transferred to the operating fund of the council as reimbursement to fund
programs of the council.
(6) Any amounts of money held by any seller or agent for the payment
of artists pursuant to this section shall be exempt from attachment or exe-
cution of judgment by the creditors of such seller or agent.
(b) Subdivision (a) shall not apply to any of the following:
(1) To the initial sale of a work of fine art where legal title to such
work of fine art where legal title to such work at the time of such initial
sale is vested in the artist thereof.
(2) To the resale of a work of fine art for a gross sales price of less
than one thousand dollars ($1,000).
(3) To a resale after the death of such artist.
(4) To the resale of the work of fine art for a gross sales price less than
the purchase price paid by the seller.
(5) To a transfer of a work of fine art which is exchanged for one or
more works of fine art or for a combination of cash, other property, and
one or more works of fine art where the fair market value of the property
exchanged is less than one thousand dollars ($1,000).
(c) For purposes of this section, the following terms have the following
meanings:
(1) "Artist" means the person who creates a work of fine art.
(2) "Fine art" means an original painting, sculpture, or drawing.
(d) This section shall become operative on January 1, 1977, and shall
apply to works of fine art created before and after its operative date.
(e) If any provision of this section or the application thereof to any
person or circumstance is held invalid for any reason, such invalidity shall
not affect any other provisions or applications of this section which can be
effected, without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the
provisions of this section are severable.
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right, this concept enables a fine artist "to claim a percentage of
the sales price each time his work of art is resold".16 The Califor-
nia Act covers all sales by California residents and any other
sales which take place in the state.17 The Act pertains only to
"fine art," defined as "original painting, sculpture, or drawing."'
8
Droit de suite is a pecuniary right which is part of the artist's
copyright. 19 It was devised as an "attempt to equalize the copy-
right status of artists with that of authors."20 An author realizes
the fruits of his labor through reproduction of his work. The origi-
nal manuscript rarely provides additional, substantial income for
an author. The right to control reproductions, therefore, is the all-
important right for an author.2 ' The prime source of income for
the artist, however, remains the tangible embodiment of the artis-
tic expression. The sale of the original work usually represents
the only income which will be received from a particular work.
"It was this disparity in meaningful copyright protection between
the writer and the graphic artist that droit de suite was intended
to correct."22
The California Resale Royalties Act specifically provides for a
five percent royalty23 to be paid to a living artist 24 upon the re-
sale25 of his work of fine art26 if the seller is a resident of Califor-
nia or if the sale takes place in the state.27 An administrative
scheme has been set up to insure that royalties paid get to the
artist.28 The California Arts Council is to receive the royalties
when an artist cannot be located by a seller.29 In such cases, if
the Arts Council "is unable to locate the artist and the artist does
Id.
16. Schulder, Art Proceeds Act: A Study of the Droit de Suite and a Proposed
Enactmentfor the United States, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 19, 22 (1966-67).
17. Section 986, supra note 15, at (a).
18. Id. at (c)(2).
19. Schulder, supra note 16, at 22.
20. M. Nimmer, LEGAL PROTECTION FOR THE ARTIST I-I (1970) (unpublished
manuscript in U.C.L.A. Law Library).
21. This reproduction right is covered by the "bundle of rights" protected by
§ 106 of the 1976 Act. 1976 Act, supra note 1, at § 106.
22. M. Nimmer, supra note 20, at 1-2.
23. Section 986, supra note 15, at (a).
24. Id. at (b)(3).
25. Id. at (b)(1).
26. Id. at (a), (c)(2).
27. Id. at (a).
28. Id. at (a)(2), (3), (4), (5) and (6).
29. Id. at (a)(2).
not file a written claim for the money .. within seven years of
the date of sale of the work of fine art, the right of the artist termi-
nates" and the money is permanently transferred to the Council
to fund its programs. 30 If, however, neither the artist nor the Arts
Council receives the 5% royalty, the artist has "three years after
the date of sale or one year after discovery of the sale, whichever
is longer," to bring an action for damages against the seller.3 1
This article will discuss the concept of droit de suite and will
analyze the only American version, the California Resale Royal-
ties Act, in light of the strong federal preemption provision of the
1976 Copyright Act. The California Act has been challenged only
once to date, in Morseburg v. Balyon.32 There, however, the chal-
lenge was under the 1909 Copyright Act since the paintings in
question were resold in 1977,33 before the effective date of the 1976
Copyright Act.34
II. Daorr DE SUITE
The rationale underlying the droit de suite is fostered by cer-
tain assumptions society clings to regarding the plight of artists.
It rests on the romantic notion of the starving artist languishing in
his garret and sly vultures attempting to divest him of his cre-
ations for a mere pittance.35 As one commentator noted, "It]he
30. Id. at (a) (5). The programs for which the Arts Council can use funding in-
clude promoting the employment of artists and craftsmen, exhibiting art works in
public buildings throughout California, and awarding prizes and grants to individ-
uals or organizations to promote the arts. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 8753 (West 1980).
31. Section 986, supra note 15, at (a) (3). The seller is under statutory duty to
report each resale for which a royalty should be paid to the artist to whom the roy-
alty is due. He is mandated to "locate the artist and pay the artist." Id. at (a) (1).
If the seller cannot locate the artist through reasonable efforts then he must pay
the royalty to the Arts Council which will, in turn, attempt to locate him. See
notes 29 and 30 supra, and accompanying text.
32. 621 F.2d 972 (9th Cir. 1980). The court in Morseburg held that the Califor-
nia Resale Royalties Act, section 986, was not inconsistent with the Copyright Act
of 1909. The 1976 Act, however, substantially revised the 1909 Act and included a
provision which expressly states that "all legal or equitable rights that are
equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as
specified by section 106 . . .and come within the subject matter of copyright as
specified by sections 102 and 103 ... published or unpublished ... are governed
exclusively by this title." 1976 Act, supra note 1, at § 301 (a). This article will show
that because of this dramatic preemption provision, section 986 is inconsistent
with the 1976 Act and, therefore, invalid.
33. 621 F.2d at 975.
34. The effective date of the 1976 Copyright Act was January 1, 1978. 1976 Act,
supra note 1, at § 301.
35. This theory has been eloquently advanced, somewhat tongue-in-cheek, by
Professor Monroe E. Price who does not believe in the "theology" behind the droit
de suite:
At its core is a vision of the starving artist, with his genius unappreciated,
using his last pennies to purchase canvas and pigments which he turns
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droit de suite is La Boheme and Lust for Life reduced to statu-
tory form."3 6
This sentimental rationale overlooks the fact that many artists
today are well-known and wealthy during their lifetimes. 37 In ad-
dition, it is often those "vultures", the canny investors, who bring
fame and fortune to these artists.38 Ilustrative of this is the well
publicized 1973 confrontation between artist Robert Raus-
chenberg and modem art collector Robert Scu11.39 When Scull
auctioned off Rauschenberg's painting "Thaw" for $85,000, after
having purchased it from the artist in the early 1960's for about
$900, Rauschenberg loudly told Scull: "I've been working my ass
off just for you to make that profit ... ."40 In the early sixties
Rauschenberg and other then-unknown modern artists were
grateful for the attention of collectors like Scull.4 1 The attention
brought by such a well-known purchaser helps escale the prices
of future paintings done by an artist, enabling him to realize
greater profit upon subsequent initial sales.42
Although this is the professed rationale underlying the droit de
into a misunderstood masterpiece. The painting is sold for a pittance,
probably to buy medicine for a tubercular wife. The purchaser is a canny
investor who travels about artists' hovels trying to pick up bargains which
he will later turn into large amounts of cash. Thirty years later the artist
is still without funds and his children are in rags; meanwhile his paint-
ings, now the subject of a Museum of Modem Art retrospective and a
Harry Abrams parlor-table book, fetch small fortunes at Park-Bernet and
Christie's.
Price, Government Policy and Economic Security for Artists: The Case of the Droit
de Suite, 77 YALE L.J. 1333, 1335 (1968).
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., In re Estate of Rothko, 77 Misc. 2d 168, 352 N.Y.S.2d 574 (1974), in
which the artist left a hotly contested estate in excess of five million dollars. See
also Estate of Rothko, 84 Misc. 2d 839, 379 N.Y.S.2d 923 (1975); In re Estate of
Rothko, 71 Misc. 2d 320, 336 N.Y.S.2d 130 (1972); Estate of Rothko, 71 Misc. 2d 74,
335 N.Y.S.2d 666 (1972); Estate of Rothko, 69 Misc. 2d 818, 330 N.Y.S.2d 915 (1972).
Pablo Picasso also died a very wealthy man. Andy Warhol, a contemporary artist,
has his name in the society columns regularly and is a fixture on the New York
social scene. His "soup can art" of the sixties made him a millionaire.
38. See notes 35-36 supra and accompanying text.
39. See R. DuriY, ART LAW: REPRESENTING ARTISTS, DEALERS AND CoLLEc-
TORS 264 (1977) (hereinafter cited as R. DUFFY) (citing Wall St. J., Feb. 11, 1974, at
1; TIME, March 11, 1974, at 66); Isenberg, The Art Royalties Act: The 5% Evasion,
L.A. Times, Dec. 21, 1980, (Calendar), at 1.
40. R. DuFFy, supra note 39, at 264.
41. The pop artist James Rosenquist reacted in astonishment when Scull
purchased one of his paintings in 1962. "I didn't think there'd be anyone crazy
enough to buy it." Id. at 264 n.1.
42. Rauschenberg serves as a case in point. Since "Thaw" brought Scull
$85,000 upon resale, Rauschenberg will most likely sell future paintings or paint-
suite, California's version will help only those artists whose
works have significantly appreciated in value during their life-
times, or those whose works were originally sold at a price of at
least $1,000 and have appreciated, however slightly.43 The Califor-
nia Resale Royalties Act applies to those works of fine art resold
for a gross sales price of more than $1,000," but only when that
resale is a profitable one for the seller.45 According to Gilbert
Edelson, secretary-treasurer of the Art Dealers Association of
America, ninty-nine percent of all works by living artists actually
declines in value.4 He contends that "no more than 200 U.S. art-
ists working today have produced works that have appreciated in
value." 47 Despite the rationale behind California's Resale Royal-
ties Act,48 Edelson claims that instead of helping the lesser-
known artists who need an economic shot in the arm, section 986
only succeeds in "making some wealthy artists slightly
wealthier."49
Droit de suite was first enacted in France in 1920 following testi-
mony before the French Parliament containing lengthy descrip-
tions of poverty-ridden artists whose works were bringing
enormous amounts upon resale.50 French legislation sought to
remedy the situation by extending a three percent royalty to art-
ists and their heirs on all original works of graphic or plastic art
ings he has already created but has not yet sold for a similar price. One can be
sure that he will never sell an original work to a collector for $900 again.
43. Section 986, supra note 15, at (b) (3) limits the Resale Royalties Act protec-
tion to living artists.
44. Id. at (b) (2).
45. Id. at (b) (4). For example, if a painting was originally bought for $100,000
and thereafter resold for $99,000 the original artist would receive no royalty under
the California Resale Royalties Act even though the resale was in excess of $1,000.
This is because the seller made no profit on the transaction. If, however, the
painting was resold for $100,001, the artist would receive a 5% royalty upon the re-
sale because the gross sales price was more than the purchase price paid by the
seller. Id. Section 986 does not take into account the possibility that such a sale,
given the reality of dealer or gallery commissions, would actually be unprofitable
to the seller. The sole criterion for extending the 5% royalty to the artist for any
artwork resold at a price in excess of $1,000 is that the gross sales price is more
than that paid by the seller. Id.
46. Isenberg, supra note 39, at 6.
47. Id.
48. See notes 35-36 supra and accompanying text.
49. Isenberg, supra note 39, at 6.
50. Hauser, The French Droit de Suite: The Problem of Protection for the Un-
derprivileged Artist Under the Copyright Law, 6 COPYRIGHT Soc'Y Buu. 94, 95
(1958). Hauser tells the tearjerking tale of Millet's grand-daughter who sold
flowers on the street to survive at a time when the artist's paintings brought large
sums of money to others upon resale. Id. See also Schulder, supra note 16, at 23.
But see Price, supra note 35, who believes that the myth perpetuated about the
starving, helpless artist is exaggerated. It was the telling of stories such as Mil-
let's, calculated to leave nary a dry eye in the house, which prompted the French
droit de suite legislation. Hauser, supra note 50, at 95.
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which are resold for a price in excess of 100 new francs.51 Private
sales are not exempted by the law, but the law in practice covers
only sales at public auctions or those by public dealers.52 The
three percent royalty must be paid regardless of whether the re-
sale has been profitable. 53
A formal procedure for collection of royalties has been estab-
lished in France. All royalties are collected by the Societe de la
Propriete Artistique des Dessins et Models (S.P.A.D.E.M.), which
then distributes the funds to an artist whose work has been re-
sold.5 4 The French droit de suite, due to S.P.A.D.E.M.'s practical
supervision and operation of collection, has been successful, at
least regarding those sales which are public.55
In West Germany, there is a different rationale behind droit de
suite. While the French theory "considers the artist's share in the
proceeds of the sale as a share in the exploitation of his work",56
the West German rationale "insists that the increased value
which is later recognized in a work has always been there in la-
tent form, and is due solely to the artist's earlier labors." 57 The
West German verison of droit de suite assumes that it would be
unjust enrichment to the speculator if the artist were precluded
from sharing in the increased value of his own work58 Despite
the "metaphysical" theory behind it, West Germany extends a
royalty of five percent of the resale price of any original art work
to artists and their heirs when the resale price exceeds 100
marks.5 9 In practice, then, since the artist will get his royalty
51. R. DuFFY, supra note 39, at 266-67. Note that protection under the French
droit de suite extends for the life of the artist plus fifty years. Price, supra note 35,
at 1333 n.l.
52. R. DuFry, supra note 39, at 266. The French have found it to be too difficult
to police private sales; thus, the law has only been enforced upon public sales.
53. Id. at 267.
54. Id. at 268. S.PAD.E.M. may retain as much as 30% of the 3% royalty as an
administrative charge. Id. at 269.
55. Id. See also Hauser, supra note 50, at 101.
56. Schulder, supra note 16, at 30. See also note 50 supra and accompanying
text.
57. Schulder, supra note 16, at 30. Schulder describes this "theory of intrinsic
value" as a "metaphysical explanation."
58. Id. Schulder notes that under such a rationale the artist should only be
able to obtain a royalty on the amount of money by which the speculator has been
enriched, the increase in value between the present and immediately prior sales.
She calls it the "capital gains theory." Id.
59. R. DurrY, supra note 39, at 269. Note that the West German droit de suite
extends the resale royalty right to artists for life plus seventy years. Id. at 270.
The French follow-up right, as well as the Italian, see note 64 itfra and accompa-
upon resale regardless of whether there has been an increase in
value or unjust enrichment to the seller, the West German law
does not support its own theory. 60 It is, in fact, very similar to the
French version of droit de suite.
Italy subscribes wholeheartedly to West Germany's "theory of
intrinsic value" 61 and puts it to actual use. Italy's droit de suite
operates by placing an assessment of between one and ten per-
cent on all sales of works of art which have increased in value
since the prior sale.62 The greater the increase in value, the
greater the artist's percentage.63 The royalty is paid for the life of
the artist, and then to his heirs for fifty years.64 Since the Italian
royalty is based on the increase of value between the present and
the prior sale, there is the distinct possibility that an artist will re-
ceive a royalty although the sale from which the royalty is derived
was for an amount less than that in the original sale from the art-
ist to the first speculator.65 Such would be the case in a hypothet-
ical situation wherein an artist sold a painting for $100,000 which
subsequently resold for $30,000. The artist would receive no roy-
alty at this juncture because there has been no increase in sales
price from the prior sale. If, however, the painting is again resold,
this time for $50,000, a royalty would be payable under Italian law
on the difference between that sales price and the directly prior
sales price of $30,000, even though the $50,000 price is half the
amount originally paid to the artist on first sale.66
In addition to legislation in France, West Germany, and Italy, at
least eleven other countries have enacted forms of droit de suite:
Belgium, Portugal, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Turkey, Tunisia,
Morocco, Algeria, Luxembourg, Chile, and Uruguay.67 California's
nying text, extends to the life of the artist plus fifty years. See note 40 supra. In
contrast, the royalty right under the California Resale Royalties Act ends at the
death of the artist.
60. See notes 50-59 supra and accompanying text.
61. See notes 57-58 supra and accompanying text.
62. Schulder, supra note 16, at 31. See also R. DuFFY, supra note 39, at 271.
Duffy notes that the monetary limits beyond which the royalty must be paid vary
with the type of artwork sold. All paintings exceeding 5,000 lire, all sculpture ex-
ceeding 10,000 lire, and drawings and prints exceeding 1,000 lire give the original
artist the right to a royalty under the Italian droit de suite. Id.
63. Price, supra note 35, at 1333 n.2. See also R. DuF"y, supra note 39, at 271.
Duffy points out that this sliding scale is more beneficial to the successful artist
whose work sells at a higher price and who, therefore, receives a higher percent-
age. In order to assist the more needy artist, it would be more appropriate to re-
verse the scale. Id. at 271 n.23.
64. Id. at 272.
65. Schulder, supra note 16, at 31-32.
66. Id.
67. R. Duwy, supra note 39, at 265.
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Resale Royalties Act68 has been the first successful attempt to in-
troduce droit de suite into the United States. 69 While simlar legis-
lation has been proposed in other states, none have yet passed a
droit de suite statute. At least one attempt has been made to in-
troduce a bill on the federal level,70 but to date without success. 71
One can only speculate as to why Congress has not seen fit to
grant a resale royalty right to artists as many European countries
have done. Perhaps it is felt that the artist reaped his reward
upon first sale and needs no further reward for his creativity. He
has gotten the benefit of his bargain and is entitled to no more
since he was not forced to part with the work at the particular
price received. Until Congress is confronted with an amendment
to the Copyright Act which proposes to give artists a resale roy-
alty, the true reason will not be known.
III. FEDERAL COPYRIGHT PREEMPTION
The Copyright Act of 1976 carries on the tradition of previous
copyright legislation by providing economic incentives to artists
by granting bundles of rights.72 It has long been acknowledged
that personal gain is the best way to encourage the talents of art-
ists, authors, and inventors, thereby advancing the public wel-
fare. 73 As early as 1788, James Madison stated: "The utility of
this [copyright] power will scarcely be questioned .... The pub-
68. See note 15 supra.
69. Isenberg, supra note 39, at 1. See also Katz, Copyright Preemption Under
the Copyright Act of 1976: The Case of Droit de Suite, 47 GEo. WASH. L REV. 200,
205 (1978). In his 1978 article, Katz pointed out that the legislatures of New York,
Ohio, and Illinois were considering droit de suite legislation. At the time of this
writing, however, no state other than California has passed a law giving resale roy-
alty rights to fine artists.
70. R. DuFY, supra note 39, at 274. Schulder proposed a model droit de suite
statute in 1966 to be considered by Congress in its deliberations in revising the
1909 Act. Schulder, supra note 16.
71. Since Schulder's model statute was proposed in 1966 to be considered by
Congress in its revision of the 1909 Act, it may be assumed that, for now, Congress
has rejected a federal version of droit de suite.
72. 1976 Act, supra note 1, at § 106. See note 8 supra.
73. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). This case concerned the question
of whether original statuettes which were reproduced and used as bases for elec-
tric lamps were copyrightable. The Supreme Court held that the statuettes were
copyrightable works of art even though they were used for an industrial purpose
and might also qualify for a design patent, since the policy behind granting both
copyrights and patents were the same. See 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03[A]
(1981).
lic good fully coincides with the claims of individuals."74 Because
the California Resale Royalties Act gives an artist, under certain
circumstances,7 5 an economic right in his work additional to those
rights given by the 1976 Copyright Act, the question of whether
that additional right is compatible with the federal law must be
raised.
Preemption of a state law by federal statute occurs when Con-
gress enacts a broad scheme of federal regulation in a particular
field, thus demonstrating its intent for national uniformity. 76 This
doctrine was derived from the supremacy clause of the United
States Constitution,77 which was interpreted by the United States
Supreme Court in McCulloch v. Maryland78 to mean that "the
States have no power ... to retard, impede, burden, or in any
manner control, the operations of the constitutional laws enacted
by Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the gen-
eral government."79 In the case of copyright law the Constitution
expressly vests in Congress the power to establish copyright pro-
tection.80 If any state law "stands as an obstacle to the accom-
plishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress"81 by encroaching upon the domain of a federal statute
enacted by Congress pursuant to its constitutional authority,
then, as the Supreme Court stated in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stif-
fel Co.,82 "it is 'familiar doctrine' that the federal policy 'may not
be set at naught, or its benefits denied' by the state law.., even
if the state law is enacted in the exercise of otherwise undoubted
state power."8 3
74. THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (J. Madison) (J.E. Cooke ed. at 288 (1961)).
75. See notes 23-31 supra and accompanying text.
76. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66 (1941). "Where the federal govern-
ment... has enacted a complete scheme of regulation... states cannot, inconsis-
tently with the purpose of Congress, conflict or interfere with, curtail or
complement, the federal law .... " Id. at 66. Hines invalidated an Alien Registra-
tion Act adopted by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania because it encroached on
powers vested in Congress and was preempted by the subsequent passage of a
federal Alien Registration Act passed pursuant to those constitutional powers.
77. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, provides in pertinent part: 'This Constitution and
the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof .. .shall
be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby ....
78. 17 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
79. Id. at 436.
80. U.S. CONsT. art I. § 8, cl. 8. See note 2 supra.
81. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941). See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 479 (1974); Florida Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141
(1963); see also note 121, infra.
82. 376 U.S. 225 (1964). See notes 93 and 94 infra and accompanying text.
83. 376 U.S. at 229 construing Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173,
176 (1942). In Sola a patent licensee challenged a price-fixing clause in his agree-
ment by showing that the patent itself was invalid. The lower court held that he
was estopped to deny the patent's validity because he accepted a license under
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A. Copyright Preemption Under the 1909 Act
The constitutionality of the California Resale Royalties Act has
been challenged in the courts only once, in Morseburg v.
Balyon.8 4 That attempt proved unsuccessful. In Morseburg it
was alleged that section 986 of the California Civil Code was pre-
empted by the Copyright Act of 1909.85 Preemption under the
1976 Act was expressly not considered in the court's decision.86
Morseburg, an art dealer, based his challenge upon those sec-
tions of the 1909 Act which gave the copyright holder the exclu-
sive right to "vend" the copyrighted work87 and prohibited the
placing of restrictions on "the transfer of any copy of a copy-
righted work the possession of which has been lawfully ob-
tained."88 He asserted that the California Resale Royalties Act,
because of the required five percent royalty to an artist upon re-
sale, impaired the artist's ability to vend his copyrighted work of
fine art and that it restricted the transfer of that artwork when it
was in the hands of a lawful purchaser, thus directly conflicting
with the 1909 Act.8 9
The Morseburg court looked for guidance to prior United States
Supreme Court decisions regarding preemption in the fields of
copyright and patent law, including Goldstein v. California,9O
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.,91 and its companion case,
that patent. The U.S. Supreme Court noted that the questions of price-fixing and
patents were so dominated by the federal statutory scheme that conflicting state
law and policy must yield.
84. 621 F.2d 972 (9th Cir. 1980). See notes 32-34 supra and accompanying text.
85. 621 F.2d at 975.
86. The court stated: "We emphasize that this case concerns the preemptive
effect of the 1909 Act only. We do not consider the extent to which the 1976 Act,
particularly section 301 (a) and (b) . . . may have preempted the California act."
Id. at 975.
87. Section 1 of the 1909 Act provides in pertinent part: "Any person entitled
thereto, upon complying with the provisions of this title, shall have the exclusive
right: (a) To print, reprint, publish, copy, and vend the copyrighted work. . .
1909 Act, supra note 2.
88. Id. at § 27.
89. 621 F.2d at 975. Morseburg argued that the California Resale Royalties Act
rewrites pre-Act sales contracts by placing additional obligations on a purchaser of
a work of fine art which he did not bargain for when the work was bought. The
court held, however, that the contracts clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1, gives
the States the right to adopt regulatory measures which serve public purposes,
without concern that private contracts will be impaired as a result. The impair-
ment in this case is not so severe as to restrict that power. Id. at 979.
90. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
91. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. 92
In both Sears and Compco, where the plaintiffs brought suit
under an Illinois unfair competition law, the lower court allowed
the recovery of damages for the copying of industrial designs
which were unpatentable and, therefore, unprotected under fed-
eral law.93 The Supreme Court held that a state unfair competi-
tion law which gave a remedy for the copying of an unpatentable
design, thus granting relief under color of state law when none
could be had under the federal regulatory scheme, conflicted with
federal patent law.94 It noted that "the patent system is one in
which uniform federal standards are carefully used to promote in-
vention while at the same time preserving free competition."9 5
This is accomplished by Congressional grant of a limited statu-
tory monopoly to reward the author or inventor with the right, for
a limited term of years, to exclude others from the use of his in-
vention.9 6 Thus, the Court reasoned, when a state granted protec-
tion where none was prescribed by the federal law it ran afoul of
the supremacy clause.97
After Sears and Compco, but while the 1909 Act was still in ef-
fect, the Supreme Court weakened the broad preemption rule by
holding that not all state concerns must yield to federal copyright
and patent laws. In Goldstein v. California,98 the Court upheld a
state law which made the "pirating" of sound recordings a crimi-
nal offense concluding that there was no preemption by federal
copyright law.99 The Court looked to legislative history, some-
thing it did not do in Sears and Compco, and found no conflict
with uniformity of federal regulation since Congress "left the area
92. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
93. In Sears, the defendant had copied plaintiffs pole lamp design. 376 U.S. at
226. In Compco, fluorescent lighting fixtures were copied. 376 U.S. at 235.
94. The Sears court noted that:
To allow a State by use of its law of unfair competition to prevent the
copying of an article which represents too slight an advance to be pat-
ented would be to permit the State to block off from the public something
which federal law has said belongs to the public .... This would be too
great an encroachment on the federal patent system to be tolerated.
376 U.S. at 231-32. See also, Compco, 376 U.S. at 237.
95. Sears, 376 U.S. at 230-31. See also, THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (J. Madison)
(J.E. Cooke ed. (1961)).
96. 376 U.S. at 229.
97. See notes 76-79 supra, and accompanying text.
98. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
99. Id. at 570-71. The "piracy" in question was prior to the congressional
amendment to the 1909 Act which made sound recordings part of the subject mat-
ter of copyright. Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971). That amendment, however,
specifically excluded from its jurisdiction sound recordings fixed prior to February
15, 1972; even if the amendment had already been enacted it would not have af-
fected the outcome. The fact that such an amendment was passed does show,
however, that there was animosity toward record piracy.
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unattended, [and thus] no reason exist[ed] why the State should
not be free to act." 0 0 Additionally, the Court observed that while
there was good reason for a uniform national system, not all
"writings" were necessarily of national interest due to the vast di-
versity of regional interest in our country of more than 200 million
people and, therefore, the individual states held copyright power
concurrently with the federal government.' 0 '
The Morseburg v. Balyon10 2 court held that the rule laid down
in Goldstein governed its decision. It reasoned that Congress, in
the 1909 Act, did not explicitly forbid the enactment of a droit de
suite law by a state 0 3 and that such a bar could not be implied by
a reasonable interpretation of the congressional grant of the ex-
clusive right to vend or by the prohibition against restricting
transfer embodied in sections 1 and 27 of the 1909 Act.104 The
court interpreted the right to vend as merely meaning "the exclu-
sive right to transfer the title for a consideration to others," 0 5 not
as a right to transfer the work at all times free and clear of all
claims of others. Therefore, the court reasoned that the Califor-
nia Resale Royalties Act did nothing to impair a seller's right to
vend. It also held that there was no restriction on transfer as pro-
hibited by section 27 of the 1909 Act. Rather than placing a legal
restraint on transfer, the court concluded that section 986 of the
100. 412 U.S. at 570. The Court noted that when the 1909 Act was passed, the
record industry was extremely small and piracy, the unauthorized duplication of
musical performances, was non-existent. Congress thus did not see the need to
cover the mechanical reproductions at that time. As technology expanded, the
1909 Act was amended, first in 1912, to include motion pictures, and again in 1971,
to finally include sound recordings. Since sound recordings had not been covered
by the 1909 Act prior to the effective date of the amendment, which was February
15, 1972, the sound recordings which Goldstein pirated could be covered by state
law. Note, however, that the 1909 Act contained no preemption section, as con-
trasted with the 1976 Act.
101. 412 U.S. at 556-58. But see notes 123-26 infra and accompanying text. Addi-
tionally, Professor Nimmer has noted that the Court had to uphold the states' con-
current copyright powers at the time of the Goldstein decision because to do
otherwise would unceremoniously throw all unpublished works covered by state
common law copyright into the public domain without warning. He notes, how-
ever, that "state laws, pursuant to such concurrent power, are, of course, subject to
preemption by federal statute." As will be shown, the 1976 Act created a single
federal system for both published and unpublished works, making the states' con-
current copyright powers "almost completely without practical significance."
1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01[A] (1981).
102. 621 F.2d at 977.
103. Id. at 977.
104. Id. at 977-78.
105. Id. at 977, quoting Bauer v. O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 11 (1913).
California Act merely created an in personam right against a
seller of a work of art; which was in Goldstein, a right additional
to those covered by the 1909 Copyright Act.106 Sears and Compco
were distinguished, as they were in Goldstein, on the ground that
since there was no conflict between the state and the federal laws,
both could function harmoniously. Therefore, the constitutional-
ity of the California Resale Royalties Act was upheld despite the
1909 Copyright Act.
B. Copyright Preemption Under the 1976 Act
Goldstein cannot, however, control the preemption issue under
the 1976 Act. Congress clearly addressed the issue of copyright
preemption in the revised law. Section 301 of the 1976 Act states
that after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights equivalent
to any rights granted by the Act to copyright owners which come
within the subject matter of copyright as defined in sections 102
and 103 are governed exclusively by federal copyright statutes. 07
The legislative history of the 1976 Act indicates that section 301
was seen by Congress as "one of the bedrock provisions of the bill
... [which] adopts a single system of Federal statutory copyright
from creation."10 8 Furthermore, it was noted that the policy of
section 301 was "intended to be stated in the clearest and most
unequivocal language possible, so as to foreclose any conceivable
misinterpretation of its unqualified intention that Congress shall
act preemptively....
Section 301 (a) sets up two conditions which must be met
before the 1976 Act eclipses state law.110 First, a right given by
state law must be equivalent to one of the exclusive rights speci-
106. 621 F.2d at 977-78.
107. Section 301 of the 1976 Act reads in pertinent part:
Sec. 301. Preemption with Respect to Other Laws
(a) On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are
equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copy-
right as specified by section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a
tangible medium of expression and come within the subject matter of
copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103, whether created before or
after that date and whether published or unpublished, are governed exclu-
sively by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or
equivalent right in any such work under the common law or statutes of
any State.
1976 Act, supra note 1, at § 301(a). See also notes 8 and 10 supra.
108. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. at 129 (1976). [hereinafter cited
as H.R. 94-1476].
109. Id. at 130. It was further noted that "[t]he preemption of rights under
State law is complete with respect to any work coming within the scope of the bill,
even though the scope of exclusive rights given the work under the bill is nar-
rower than the scope of common law rights in the work might have been." Id. at
131.
110. See note 107 supra.
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fled in section 106. Second, the right must come within the sub-
ject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103. To
answer the statutory preemption puzzle, therefore, an examina-
tion of these sections is required.
The question of whether the subject matter covered by the Cali-
fornia Resale Royalties Act comes within the subject matter of
copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103 of the 1976 Act is
easily solved. Sections 102 and 103 define the subject matter of
copyright. Section 102 provides copyright protection for all
"works of authorship", which include "pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works."' This, too, is the subject matter of section
986, the California Resale Royalties Act; therefore, the subject
matter of the California law is equivalent to that of the federal
statute.112
Whether the California Resale Royalties Act grants a right
equivalent to one of the exclusive rights in copyright authorized
by the 1976 Act requires a more complex inquiry. Section 106 lists
the fundamental rights given copyright owners: the exclusive
rights of reproduction, adaptation, publication, performance, and
display.113 These rights are not absolute, however, since Con-
gress has expressly seen fit to limit them. The legislative history
of the bill tells us that the rather broad exclusive rights set forth
in section 106 are limited, qualified, or excepted because
"[elverything in section 106 is made 'subject to sections 107
through 118,' and must be read in conjunction with those
provisions."114
The exclusive right granted by section 106(3) of the 1976 Act
upon which the California Resale Royalties Act touches is the
right "to distribute copies ... to the public by sale or other trans-
fer of ownership. . . .,115 However, this distribution right has
been limited by section 109, which prescribes the protection given
by section 106(3) to only distribution prior to first sale or transfer.
Once the copyright owner has sold or transferred title to a partic-
ular copy of his work, he relinquishes his distribution right as to
111. 1976 Act, supra note 1, at § 102(a) (5). See note 10 supra.
112. The subject matter of section 986 is "fine art," defined as "an original paint-
ing, sculpture, or drawing." Section 986, supra note 15, at (c) (2).
113. See note 8 supra.
114. H.R. 94-1476 at 61.
115. 1976 Act, supra note 1, at § 106 (3). Section 101 of the 1976 Act defines
"copies" so as to include originals: "the material object, other than a phonorecord,
in which the work is first fixed." Id.
that copy and the lawful owner "is entitled, without the authority
of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the posses-
sion of that copy. ... 116 The legislative history of the 1976 Act
discloses that Congress intended the distribution rights of the
copyright owner go no further than the first distribution: "As sec-
tion 109 makes clear... the copyright owner's rights under sec-
tion 106(3) cease with respect to a particular copy . ..once he
has parted with ownership of it."117
Since the 1976 Act makes it abundantly clear that once a copy-
right owner divests himself of ownership of a particular copy of
his work, all his distribution rights, including the economic bene-
fits of distribution, cease; therefore, the California Resale Royal-
ties Act must fail. The five percent royalty conferred on the
copyright owner upon resale extends the economic benefit he de-
rives beyond that received from the original distribution of his
work.l"8 Congress stressed that a state law is equivalent to copy-
right and subject to preemption even if the precise contours of
the state-created right may not be coextensive with the compara-
ble right under the Copyright Act of 1976.119 Therefore, although
the conditions which the California statute places upon the distri-
bution right of the copyright owner do not control that limited
right, it sufficiently conflicts with congressional intent to be abro-
gated and preempted by the 1976 Act.
Additionally, it must be noted that Goldstein v. California120
cannot conclusively control a preemption issue under the 1976
Act. The 1909 Act which controlled at the time of Goldstein did
not include any congressional preemption mandate equivalent to
that embodied in the 1976 Act. The message the Supreme Court
sent Congress in Goldstein and later in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp. 121 was clear: If federal copyright law was to be presumed
to preempt the field, it must clearly assert its power. If not, the
states could act independently. 22 With the enactment of section
116. 1976 Act, supra note 1, at § 109 (a).
117. H.R. 94-1476, supra note 108, at 62.
118. See notes 23-31 supra and accompanying text.
119. H.R. 94-1476, supra note 108, at 131. See note 109 supra. See also notes 79-
83 supra; I NimmER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01[B] (1981).
120. 412 U.S. 546 (1973). See notes 98-101 supra and accompanying text.
121. 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
122. See Brown, supra note 3, at 1091. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S.
470 (1974) upheld the power of states to protect trade secrets regarding inventions
even if those inventions might have been patentable since trade secrets law en-
courages invention, as does patent law. Kewanee, taken together with the Court's
message in Goldstein, that subject matter not explicitly covered by federal statute
was presumptively within the purview of the states to protect, prompted Congress'
strong statement in section 301 of the 1976 Act.
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301 Congress resoundingly answered the Court's challenge. 23
Finally, the Goldstein Court noted that its decision was based
in part on the fact that not all subjects need be covered by federal
law. The California legislature enacted section 986 pursuant to a
state policy to encourage artists in their crafts for the benefit of
society.124 The Supreme Court believed that some things worthy
of protection might be significant only regionally and should be
acted upon by those individual states concerned.125 However, the
nurturing of artists to benefit society cannot be thought of as be-
ing of "purely local importance."126 James Madison was of the
opinion that the claims of individual artists in their works coin-
cided with the public good and he thus urged that Congress be
authorized to pass laws to protect their rights.127 Surely Califor-
nia does have a large population of artists, but just as surely art-
ists also flourish throughout the fifty states. The protection of
their interests can, therefore, only be deemed to be national in
scope.
IV. CONCLUSION
The only conclusion which can be reached is that California's
version of droit de suite has been preempted by the 1976 Act. The
California Resale Royalties Act comes within the scope of copy-
right law128 and expands upon one of the rights granted by the
federal statute. 29 Additionally, since Morseburg v. Balyon130 was-
not decided under the current law which includes a new, strong
preemption provision, it is not controlling.
123. See notes 107-109 supra and accompanying text.
124. CAI. Gov'r CODE § 8750 (West 1980) describes California's legislative per-
ceptions and policy regarding art:
The Legislature perceives that life in California is enriched by art.
The source of art is in the natural flow of the human mind. Realizing
craft and beauty is demanding, however, the people of the state desire to
encourage and nourish these skills wherever they occur, to the benefit of
all.
Id.
125. 412 U.S. at 558.
126. Id. The perceptions and policy of the California legislature expressed in
CAL. Gov~r CODE § 8750 (West 1980), merely echoes the sentiments prompting the
constitutional mandate "to promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts."
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
127. THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (J. Madison) (J.E. Cooke ed. (1961)).
128. See note 111 supra and accompanying text.
129. See notes 114-116 supra and accompanying text.
130. 621 F.2d 972 (9th Cir. 1980). See notes 84-86 supra and accompanying text.
An effective droit de suite law is needed in the United States to
more completely protect the rights of fine artists in their works.
Such a law must come from Congress as an amendment to the
1976 Copyright Act. The individual states cannot infringe upon
the sole authority of Congress by granting a right which comes
within the purview of copyright.
Hopefully, Congress can learn from the weaknesses of the Cali-
fornia Resale Royalties Act and correct them when formulating a
federal droit de suite law. The California Act does not really ben-
efit most artists, nor does it provide for effective enforcement of
its provisions.131 In practice, only those resales which are in the
public eye tend to bring forth the required royalties. 32
It is time that the United States Congress recognize that fine
artists need greater copyright protection to put them in a position
comparable to authors and recording artists.133 As the United
States Supreme Court so aptly stated: "Sacrificial days devoted
to such creative activities deserve rewards commensurate with
the services rendered."' 34
LYNN K. WARREN
131. See notes 43-49 supra and accompanying text. See also Katz, supra note
69, at 220, who points out that the same problem has proven to be a consequence
of the French droit de suite.
132. Isenberg, supra note 39, at 6, quotes a Los Angeles art market manage-
ment consultant as estimating that "about $750,000 is due in 1980 artists' royalties"
but only a fraction of that amount has been paid.
Isenberg also notes that there is no regulatory body checking on what is being
resold. Id. The French regulatory body S.P.A.D.E.M., has effected a successful
collection operation for that country's artist royalty system. See notes 54-55 supra
and accompanying text. Artist Billy Al Bengston stated that "the amount of
money you collect is never enough to make it worth the hassle." He claims to
have written several people whom he believes owe him a royalty but has never
received a reply. Isenberg, supra note 39, at 6. Andy Warhol complains that "[i]t's
hard enough collecting money on the original sale, let alone royalties."
133. See notes 19-22 supra and accompanying text. The case of a recording art-
ist is especially noteworthy. He is granted a royalty each time his recording is
commercially played. 1976 Act, supra note 1, at §§ 114-16. Therefore, in addition to
the economic benefit he derives from making the original recording he reaps the
benefits of each commercial replay. Why, then, is a fine artist granted pecuniary
reward only from the first sale of each copy of his work.
134. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
